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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Anthropological and sociological research has long shown the existence of 
intrahousehold gender discrimination, thus questioning the traditional unitary 
household allocation model. Gender differences affect power relations among 
household members as reported, for instance, in Blumberg (1988), Pahl (1989), and 
Jejeebhoy (1995). The proportion of individual income contributed to the household 
varies significantly by gender, as documented in places as different as India, Mexico, 
Cameroon or Honduras. Other manifestations of power imbalance include differences 
in consumption patterns (see e.g., Blumberg, 1988), domestic violence (e.g., Rao, 
1997), fertility decisions and social activities (e.g., Casique, 2000).  
Although economic research has, since the 1960s, developed alternative 
models of intrahousehold allocation to the unitary paradigm,1 intrahousehold relations 
still need to be further specified if they are to become relevant in policy-making. In 
spite of some developments in the characterization of these relations (described both 
as cooperative and non-cooperative games), they remain something of a ‘black box’.  
There is, however, wide consensus on a number of factors affecting the bargaining 
power of household members — from dowries and pre-marriage assets, to human 
capital differentials among parents, or labor and social incomes. Beyond these general 
assumptions, this article explores the capacity of social transfers to test alternative 
intrahousehold allocation mechanisms. Conveniently — even without describing the 
                                                          
1 See Leuthold (1968), Ashenfelter & Heckman (1974), Schultz (1990), Browning et al (1994) for some 
classic references.  
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dynamics of alternative mechanisms to the unitary model — the classical household 
model needs only be expanded minimally to allow for this empirical testing. In fact, 
distinctive properties associated with categories of social transfers make these 
incomes especially suitable for testing intrahousehold behavioral relations. Typically, 
the non-transferability of in-kind social transfers (in contrast with cash transfers) is 
shown theoretically to lead to differentiated impacts on the decision to work among 
household members. In designing bargaining tests which substantiate the distinctive 
nature of social transfers and their application to Chilean data, this paper casts new 
light on intrahousehold distribution. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 builds some alternative exogenous 
and endogenous bargaining specifications of household behavior that predict 
alternative effects of social transfer categories on individual work decisions. It then 
details the estimating strategy that enables a proper testing of alternative 
intrahousehold behavior. Section 3 first estimates the value of Chilean social benefits 
transferred in 1996, before applying the estimating and testing strategy developed in 
section 2 to mid-1990s Chilean data.. Section 4 then assesses social transfer effects 
and conducts the proposed tests; Section 5 summarizes the findings of the paper.  
 
  
2. TESTING STRATEGIES  
 
Modeling intrahousehold allocation behavior  
In addition to their properties of flexibility and tractability (Stern, 1984), the appeal of 
the quasi-homothetic Cobb-Douglas utility functions is the link forged between 
consumption, income, poverty, and individual labor supply (Chiappori, 1997). In 
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contrast with previous analyses of poverty and labor supply,2 the decision to 
participate in work and (conditional on participation) the preferred number of working 
hours, are separated. As Killingsworth (1983) argues, even though both labor 
dimensions may result from the same decision process, their determinants do not need 
to have the same impacts on each decision. Cross-section evidence reported for Chile 
supports this characterization.3 What remains unclear from the research of 
intrahousehold allocation is how the different determinants interact towards a joint 
decision. However (and rather conveniently), the modeling of collective forms of 
household labor supply does not require much additional complexity for testing 
purposes: that is, testing whether social transfers are relevant determinants of 
bargaining vis–a-vis other factors and other intrahousehold allocation behaviors. In 
effect, labor decisions can be modeled using a similar maximization program to the 
unitary model, except that different categories of incomes now determine bargaining. 
In-kind incomes are no longer pooled together with the rest of cash incomes 
generated; that is, not every category of income is susceptible to redistribution within 
the household. Also, non-labor incomes may well have an impact on the generation of 
household resources. In as much as this impact is significant, non-labor primary 
incomes and social transfers act as determinants of bargaining. This specific impact of 
social incomes on generated incomes, called here the bargaining effect, accompanies 
the traditional income effect in unitary household models.  
                                                          
2 Leuthold (1968), Garfinkel et al (1990), Licona (1997) 
3 The incidence of poverty appears to be related to differentials in participation, while the depth of 
poverty is associated with working hour differentials. According to the CASEN 1996 household 
income survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996), participation rates are uniform across the working age extreme 
and moderate poor (45%) but are higher for the non-poor (54%). Only the extreme poor appear to work 
less hours than the moderate and non-poor (42 to 44 weekly hours, respectively). Men participate more 
and work longer hours than women (a gap of 35% and 4 weekly hours, respectively). In addition, 
household heads participate more (2.5%) but work similar hours (44 a week) compared to household 
non-heads. Other differences in work effort found by age and skill of individuals as well as number of 
children and location of the household indicate that individuals may adjust their labor supply 
differently through participation and working hours.  
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Collective labor supply modeling requires the inclusion of individual 
allocation weights, which shape the bargaining or sharing rule. Following the 
distinction in the literature, exogenous and endogenous determinants of bargaining are 
differentiated here. The effect that the variation of exogenous determinants has on the 
bargaining function is a priori open and can either strengthen or weaken the 
bargaining position of each individual. However, increases in the non-labor incomes 
controlled by an individual are expected to strengthen his or her bargaining position, 
while they weaken the position of remaining members. All individual weights in the 
sharing rule must add up to unity, and individual weights may range from zero (i.e., 
no control of his or her own resources) to unity (if the individual controls all the 
resources in the household).  The resulting maximization problem under 
intrahousehold bargaining is then equivalent to a one-stage representation in which 
individuals maximize their own utility functions after some share of household 
income has been apportioned to them in accordance with their bargaining strength 
(Chiappori, 1997). The first order condition leads to the optimal participation 
condition. Similarly, labor reaction curves for each household member (grouped as 
household head and household non-head members) are derived (see Appendix 1). 
Both optimal conditions differ from the unitary model in that they introduce 
individual allocation weights from the bargaining rule and a separate treatment of 
cash and in-kind non-labor incomes, depending on their transferability. 
The effects of social transfers on working hours under alternative 
intrahousehold allocation models are predicted by working out their partial derivatives 
on each work dimension and on each category of household members. The predicted 
effects reported in Table 1 show that the microeconomic effects of social transfers are 
not systematically negative. More important, distinctive effects of social transfers help 
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differentiate unitary from collective models. As individual cash transfers can be 
redistributed to other household members, they do not necessarily increase the 
bargaining power of the original recipient, but rather the power of the individual(s) 
who gain their ultimate control. In contrast, in-kind transfers cannot be part of 
intrahousehold redistribution, thus enhancing only the bargaining position of their 
original recipients. It may still be argued that higher social transfers associated with 
time spent in school or undergoing medical treatment (that is, not working) do not 
necessarily improve the bargaining position of their beneficiaries in the short run.4  
However, the subsidies associated with public education or medical services cannot 
be re-directed to other household members. As such, beneficiaries appropriate the 
marginal bargaining power associated with such transfers. Consequently, the impact 
that in-kind transfers and cash transfers may have on the intrahousehold distribution 
of power are potentially different.5 The aggregate impact of social transfers becomes 
complex and ambiguous in the presence of bargaining due to counterbalancing 
impacts among direct, indirect, and bargaining effects.   
 
<TABLE 1>  
 
 
 
Estimating labor supply household models 
A separate modeling of each labor dimension does not prevent sample selection bias, 
endogeneity, and measurement errors in wages and virtual incomes,6 however. These 
                                                          
4 In the long run, expected higher earnings from increased human capital may improve the future 
bargaining position within the household, or even lead to the creation of a new household.  
5 An alternative interpretation — that time spent in activities other than labor should be divided into 
those increasing relative bargaining power (such as human capital investment) and those decreasing it 
(such as leisure) — is not free of problems. For example, nutritional cash transfers should then have the 
same bargaining effect on labor decisions as, say, in-kind educational transfers. As seen below, 
however, the effects of cash and in-kind transfers on labor decisions in Chile are not equal.  
6 Virtual income is the hypothetical income that a tax-payer would find untaxed under an alternative 
system with the same flat tax rate that he or she pays in the current tax system. Virtual incomes are 
typically subject to sample selection (like wages) because individuals participating in the labor market 
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biases in the labor and household surveys are typically corrected using the Heckman 
(1979) estimation technique and instrumental variables. This paper adds to this 
tradition. Working hour decisions are modeled through a sample selection corrected 
ordinary least squares (OLS) including the same wages and virtual incomes corrected 
by the Heckman procedure. The Mills Ratios constructed from the Heckman 
technique are used in the estimation of the OLS only for individuals reporting positive 
working hours and positive labor incomes. The same explanatory variables included 
in the working hour model are used in the participation model, given that both 
dimensions are part of the same process underlying the decision to supply work effort. 
Three specifications for both participation and working hour models are used, 
gradually disaggregating non-labor income categories. The first specification 
disaggregates all possible categories of social incomes; the second divides transfers 
into individual and other household members´ categories; the last specification brings 
together all categories of individual and other household members’ transfers. A final 
disaggregation singles out participation and working hours by socio-economic group. 
According to the position of the household with respect to the extreme and moderate 
official poverty lines adjusted for scale economies, households are categorized as 
extreme poor, moderate poor and non-poor.7  The most disaggregated specifications 
for participation ([1]) and working hours ([2]) are, respectively, as follows: 
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may have a stronger taste for work and a higher inclination to “select” higher marginal tax rates and, 
therefore, a larger virtual income. See Hausman (1985). 
7 Official extreme and moderate poverty lines in 1996 Chile amounted to Ch$ 13,024 and Ch$ 23,108 
for rural households, and Ch$ 17,136 and Ch$ 34,272 for urban households (MIDEPLAN, 2000). 
Household sizes were adjusted by the Rothbarth method used in World Bank (1997). 
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where πi  represents the individual probability of participation in the labor market; Hi,  
individual working hours (conditional on participation); w(1-t)i, individual net labor 
incomes; VIi, individual virtual incomes; Ni, individual non-labor primary incomes 
(i.e., financial incomes, rents, pensions and self-consumption); , individual cash 
social transfers;  , in-kind social transfers on education (k=”e”) and health 
(k=”h”), of individual “i”, or, other household member “j”, respectively; and Z
c
iS
h,e
j,iS
im , 
exogenous variables, which include individual, household and regional characteristics 
affecting individuals’ participation. Individual exogenous determinants of labor 
decisions refer to human capital (i.e., years of school and linear and quadratic forms 
of age); marital status; gender; and the position of the individual within the household 
(i.e., head and non-heads). Household characteristics include the demographic 
composition of the household. A final characteristic is the location of the household. 
Additional variables are chosen specifically for non-heads in order to control for the 
characteristics of the household head. Such characteristics include the income of the 
household head; his or her labor status (and if working, whether formal or informal); 
his or her occupation; and the gender of the household head. These variables provide 
an insight into whether the gender and other conditions of the household head have 
different effects on non-heads. In Chile, Rubalcava and Contreras (1999) found that 
this was the case, based on information on the nutritional status of children.  
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Testing Alternative Intrahousehold Models 
The testing strategy consists of comparing the signs of theoretically predicted effects 
of social transfers on work decisions with their observed effects estimated as 
elasticities from labor supply models.8 As argued above, social transfers under unitary 
and collective models have different predicted effects on the decision to participate, 
depending on their cash or in-kind nature and who controls them. As the predicted 
effects on working hours are not distinctive across intrahousehold allocation models, 
they are unsuitable for testing bargaining specifications. Table 2 details the proposed 
tests. 
 
<TABLE 2>  
 
 
 
3. SOCIAL TRANSFERS IN CHILE 
 
Social transfers in mid-1990s Chile were affected by the reforms of the Pinochet 
administration in the 1970s and 1980s and the new social agenda, ‘growth with 
equity’, of the Concertación administrations through the 1990s. Social policies in the 
1990s adopted a more comprehensive strategy, replacing the low-priority anti-cyclical 
and ultra-targeted expenditures of the 1980s.  Although the earlier competition and 
decentralization reforms were not reversed, the emphasis of social policy-making 
shifted towards increases in the quality of provision and a more encompassing 
targeting. This strategy was also used as a redistributive tool as high-income groups 
                                                          
8 The underlying assumption is that there should not be a substantial gap between optimal (desired) and 
observed (actual) work effort. By and large, this assumption holds for the tight Chilean labor market in 
the mid-1990s, where work supply was typically absorbed by an increasing demand throughout a 
period of rapid and sustained economic growth.  Job creation in Chile grew at a faster pace than did the 
labor force and the population. Low unemployment rates in the first half of the 1990s suggest that labor 
was certainly not constrained by the supply of work.  
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increasingly opted out of public provision systems, leaving public schools and clinics 
for low-income groups. Ultimately, the new agenda aimed at distributing the proceeds 
of the resumed sustainable high economic growth among all Chileans, without 
jeopardizing macroeconomic balances. Substantial increases of per capita social 
expenditures9 were therefore not financed by increases in debt but by an 
unprecedented tax reform resulting from the political consensus of all parties in 
Congress.  
At a disaggregated level, analysis of the distributive impact of these social 
policy changes requires that monthly unitary social transfers are first valued and then 
imputed to their beneficiaries. To impute such benefits, available aggregated data on 
costs and beneficiaries of public social services, on the one hand, and information on 
self-reported beneficiaries from the 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 
1996), on the other, are linked. Appendix 2 presents descriptive socioeconomic 
statistics on households as well as on the nature of transfers, their providers, 
beneficiaries and benefits for that year. The current valuation of benefits follows 
traditional practice by equating them to provision costs (Selowsky, 1979) under the 
principle of effective transfers. Contrary to a previous valuation in Chile (see Millán 
et al, 1999), only benefits effectively disbursed are imputed even when they differ 
from official statutory values. Specific to the Chilean context, the imputation of 
medical transfers distinguishes between billed and unbilled benefits. This distinction 
separates two components of medical subsidies: deductions in the medical bill to the 
patient (according to his/her socio-economic status) and the gap between real effective 
costs and billed costs, respectively.  Finally, estimated benefits are imputed to self-
reported beneficiaries on an individual basis. 
                                                          
9 The increases totaled some 50% in real terms from US$ 230 to US$347 (in 1986 prices) between 
1990 and 1996. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
Estimating Social Transfers Effects 
Estimates clearly show that social transfers have on aggregate a significant but rather 
small effect on working decisions. This is shown in the upper section of Table 3. At 
the most aggregated level, a 100% increase in total non-labor incomes would have 
decreased participation by only 0% to 5%, and even less for working hours (between 
0% and 1%). These estimates fall within ranges reported in previous studies, although 
this is not especially revealing: a prudent interval for estimates reported in studies in 
the US and UK averages the elasticities of non-labor incomes at between 0% and 20% 
for male working hours and between –20% and 0% for female working hours (see 
Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). Although those studies and the present one are 
not strictly comparable because of differences in the categories of incomes and 
sample groups, estimated elasticities are reassuringly close.  
As expected, participation elasticities are larger than working hour 
elasticities.11 Elasticities for female non-heads are lower than those for female heads. 
The opposite is true for men, probably indicating the responsibility of the traditional 
breadwinner to cater for the rest of the household. Also, this work effort may well 
limit their possibilities of raising additional effort to any degree. In turn, lower 
elasticities of female non-heads may indicate a restricted access to labor markets, 
which can be attributed to greater household responsibilities than those of male 
household members. These responsibilities include child care and maintenance 
                                                          
11 Participation elasticities are expected to be larger than working hour elasticities because the direct, 
indirect, and bargaining effects of the former typically work in the same direction. This is not the case 
for working hours. See Table 1 above.  
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activities, as documented by Juster and Stafford (1991) and Floro (1995) for 
developing countries, and Rubalcava and Contreras (1999) specifically for Chile.  
Estimates for disaggregated specifications of social incomes suggest that 
household members have different access to household incomes. In contrast with the 
prediction of the unitary model, elasticities of individual incomes and those of other 
household members clearly differ (see the intermediate section in Table 3). This holds 
true for men and women, heads and non-heads, and participation and working hours. 
Related to other household members’ elasticities, both female and male elasticities 
have either neutral or positive effects on the individual decision to work. The size of 
these effects is small: an increase of between 0% and 19% in participation following 
increases of 100% in these incomes, and –0.4% and 6% for working hours. When 
some individuals within the household increase their incomes, other household 
members seem to react as if trying to maintain their income balance inside the 
household. Once again, this is at odds with the unitary model and more indicative of 
some bargaining process within the household.  
At the most disaggregated level of social incomes (see the lower section in 
Table 3), in-kind transfers have generally larger effects on both participation and 
working hour decisions than cash transfers do. This is likely to be the result of larger 
incomes delivered through in-kind transfers and the inability of individuals to control 
other individuals’ in-kind transfers. Interestingly, individual cash and in-kind transfers 
received by female members have a negative effect both on their participation and 
working hours. By contrast, the effects of other household members’ transfers on their 
working decision are either neutral or positive. Social incomes received by men have 
either negative or neutral effects both on participation and working hours. This is true 
for both head and non-head males. Negative effects on participation suggest once 
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again that males are most likely to use such incomes to consume more leisure rather 
than to strengthen their bargaining position. Other household members’ social 
transfers do not seem to have significant (or if statistically significant, not substantial) 
effects on the decision to work, either among heads or non-heads.   
 
<TABLE 3>  
 
 Tests on Intrahousehold Allocation 
Tests strongly reject the unitary model in all cases.  Interestingly, tests on collective 
models of intrahousehold allocation (see Table 4) suggest the presence of collective 
behavior among Chilean households only for certain categories of members. Thus, the 
hypothesis of endogenous bargaining determined by social transfers holds for all 
groups except male household heads. Even so, neither exogenous nor endogenous 
bargaining seems to explain individual behavior among poor households (see Table 
5). Furthermore, the endogenous bargaining hypothesis is only proven among non-
poor households, which receive a lower share of social transfer vis-à-vis labor 
incomes.  There may be several reasons for this. Categories other than income (such 
as asset ownership, as suggested by Licona, 1997) may well explain differences in 
behavior. Also, categories of social cash transfers may have worked in different 
directions. Thus, assistance cash transfers and work-related family allowances may 
have different impacts on the redistribution strategy of the household, given that their 
receipt depends on different circumstances.12 Another possible explanation is that 
poor households do not use social transfers strategically to gain or enforce bargaining 
power within their households: rather, they may use such transfers as an investment 
                                                          
12 Unfortunately, the 1996 CASEN household survey does not provide sufficient information on assets 
or on disaggregated categories of cash transfers to allow for exploring the relevance of these 
conjectures. 
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for the future. Poor households have fewer investment opportunities and less access to 
private services with which to build their human capital stocks than non-poor 
households. It is also likely — without contradicting previous explanations — that 
other sources of incomes are more important for bargaining purposes. In particular, 
one may expect labor incomes to be the main determinant of bargaining. The larger 
size of estimated wage elasticities, compared to social transfer elasticities, suggests 
that this may well be the case.   
 
<TABLES 4 AND 5>  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The empirical estimates of this paper confirm that social transfers in Chile can be used 
for redistributive purposes without eroding either macroeconomic balances or the 
income-generation ability of those whom they are meant to help the most. Had social 
transfers doubled in 1996, average labor supply would only have decreased by 
between 1 and 27 minutes per week! Unfortunately, there is no evidence that shifting 
the composition of social benefits towards in-kind transfers would automatically 
enhance the bargaining position of the most vulnerable members within households. 
Instead, evidence appears conclusive in rejecting both unitary household models and 
exogenously determined bargaining. In spite of an asymmetric distribution of 
responsibilities within the household, the hypothesis of endogenous bargaining is only 
accepted among the non-poor. Among poor households, social transfers are unlikely 
to be used in strategic power relations in the short run, but rather as investments for 
the long run. At the same time, more substantial sources of incomes, such as labor, 
may also determine endogenous bargaining. 
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APPENDIX 1: HOUSEHOLD MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM WITH 
INTRAHOUSEHOLD BARGAINING 
 
After the classical maximization problem is expanded to include the sharing rule, the 
intrahousehold bargaining problem becomes:  
1,)()(max
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where C represents individual consumption;  L, the leisure composite; H , work effort 
(measured in working hours); χ,  the minimum level of consumption (whose 
equivalent income value can be thought as the extreme poverty line); λ,  the minimum 
level of leisure;  w,  wage or unitary labor income; X,  full income; T, the maximum 
time available; N, the non-labor primary income; Sc , cash social transfers; and  Sk , in-
kind social transfers on education, health, housing subsidies.  
A convenient way to represent the set of partial derivatives for endogenous 
determinants of bargaining without loss of generality is the following: 
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The first order condition of the maximization problem leads to the optimal 
participation condition:  
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Similarly, optimal working hours can be derived from solving the following 
reaction-curve equations:   
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APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS AND SOCIAL TRANSFERS IN CHILE, 1996. 
 
Household Descriptive Statistics 
 Female Male 
 Head Non-head Head Non-head 
Individual characteristics     
Percentage (%) 10.8 89.2 39.8 60.2 
Schooling years 8.3 7.6 9.8 6.4 
Age 54.5 26.9 45.1 17 
Marriage Rate (%) 13.5 42.6 90.7 8.5 
Location in urban areas (%) 89.3 84.5 83.4 82.8 
Location in Santiago (%) 44.1 40.9 39.3 39.1 
Household characteristics      
Size 3.9 4.2 
Number of children aged 0-14 0.8 1.3 
Number of children aged 0-11 0.6 1.0 
Number of elder (aged 65 +) 0.4 0.1 
Number of female elder (aged 65+) 0.3 0.1 
Number of servants 0.1 0.1 
Number of non-participant females  0.9 0.4 
Labor characteristics     
Participation (%) 45.8 33.3 82.0 43.2 
Weekly working hours 41.7 41.8 46.6 44.2 
Incomes (1986 US$)     
Individual incomes      
From principal occupation, net of 
taxes 
106.5 59.0 285.8 80.8 
Primary incomes other than labor * 18.6 18.0 22.5 14.5 
Cash transfers 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Education in-kind transfers 0.02 5.1 0.01 8.2 
Health in-kind transfers 2.2 1.6 0.9 1.2 
Other household members’ 
incomes 
    
From principal occupation, net of 
taxes 
208.6 444.1 171.6 430.6 
Primary incomes other than labor * 3.0 4.6 3.7 5.1 
Cash transfers 14.3 21.1 20.3 20.6 
Education in-kind transfers 3.1 5.1 4.5 5.6 
Health in-kind transfers     
All household incomes     
All primary 474.3 502.6 
All monetary 499.9 527.7 
All monetary and in-kind  526.1 553.1 
 
Source: Author’s estimates from 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996).  
Note: * Incomes expressed in monthly 1986 US$. Primary incomes other than labor refer to pensions, 
financial incomes, rents and self-consumption.  
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Description and Valuation of Social Transfers in Chile 
TYPE OF TRANSFERS PROVIDER BENEFITS BENEFICIARIES VALUE 
monthly 
1986 US$ 
In-kind education transfers     
MINEDUC General Subsidy     
Municipal MINEDUC  
   Pre-basic  14.1 
   Basic  15.3 
   Secondary, humanities  18 
   Secondary, technology  20 
   Special  50.1 
   Adults  
Total subsidies reported by 
MINEDUC for each level and 
category of public education 
Students registered in and 
attending municipal pre-basic, 
basic and secondary schools 
12.5 
Publicly subsidized private MINEDUC  
   Pre-basic  13.6 
   Basic  14.1 
   Secondary, humanities  17.1 
   Secondary, technology  18.5 
   Special  37.5 
   Adults  
Total subsidies reported by 
MINEDUC for each level and 
category of publicly subsidized 
private schools 
Students registered in and 
attending publicly subsidized 
private pre-basic, basic and 
secondary schools 
11.8 
Pre-basic subsidy JUNJI Costs involved in provision: personnel 
costs, goods and services, food and 
material provided at centers, and 
investment in equipment 
Students registered in JUNJI 
centers. 
42.5 
Special integration subsidy INTEGRA Personnel costs, goods and services, 
food in centers, investment in 
equipment 
Students aged 0-6 registered in 
INTEGRA centers. 
40.5 
Books at school program MINEDUC MINEDUC reported total costs Students registered in pre-basic 
and basic schools 
0.1 
School food program JUNAEB  
   Breakfast / tea  4.1 
   Lunch  7.7 
   Breakfast + lunch / lunch + tea   10.5 
   Breakfast + lunch + tea  
Simple average unitary price paid by 
JUNAEB on effectively disbursed 
rations, by categories of food rations 
Students registered in basic and 
secondary public and 
subsidized schools targeted as 
vulnerable by JUNAEB 
14.6 
Health program JUNAEB Total costs of provision of medical 
treatments that follow up initial 
teacher’s checkups. 
Students registered in first to 
sixth grade basic schools, both 
municipal and/or publicly 
subsidized 
1.2 
Oral hygiene program JUNAEB Total costs of provision as reported Students registered in first to 
sixth grade basic schools, both 
municipal and/or publicly 
subsidized 
0.7 
School material program JUNAEB Total costs per set of school material Beneficiaries of School food 
program 
0.1 
In-kind health transfers     
Transfers from National Health 
Network 
    
Institutional modality National Health 
Network 
 
   Consults  4.5 
   Laboratory exams  1.9 
   X-ray exams  11.1 
   Surgery  68.9 
   Dental care  4.4 
   Non-Caesarean delivery  132.8 
   Caesarean delivery   203.4 
   Hospitalization   
Total billed and unbilled costs for 
provision of medical services reported 
by NHN budgets for each category of 
co-financing 
Institutional modality public 
users 
32.7 
Effective modality National Health 
Network 
 
   Consults  2.7 
   Laboratory exams  1.0 
   X-ray exams  6.6 
   Surgery  60.9 
   Dental care  0.0 
   Non-Caesarean delivery  73.8 
   Caesarean delivery   90.1 
   Hospitalization   
Total billed costs reported by NHN 
across medical categories (no co-
financing categories) 
Effective modality public users 
2.1 
Supplementary feeding program Health Ministry  
Basic feeding   
   Women  4.1 
   0-11 month-old  4.1 
   12-23 month-old   4.1 
   2-5 year-old  
Unitary costs of complementary food 
sets comprising milk, cereal and rice 
Pregnant women, mothers at 
nutritional risk and infants aged  
0-5 
1.2 
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Reinforced feeding   
   Women  4.9 
   0-11 month-old  7.0 
   12-23 month-old   5.3 
   2-5 year-old  
  
3.3 
Cash Transfers     
Assistance pensions Social Security 
Institute 
Non-contributory monthly pensions Elderly and disabled adults 
below an income threshold not 
affiliated to any social 
insurance scheme 
25.4 
Assistance family allowance Social Security 
Institute 
Non-contributory benefits paid 
monthly by household heads 
according to entitlements 
Households with specific 
entitlements (e.g. under-15s, 
pregnant women in extremely 
poor households) whose head is 
not affiliated to any social 
insurance scheme 
3.0 
General family allowance Social Security 
Institute 
Three-tier allowance based on income 
level 
Workers with entitlements: 
(under-18s, unemployed 
spouse, widowed mother, 
orphan children, over-65s) 
(0.0; 1.0; 
2.9) 
Severance benefit Social Security 
Institute 
Three-tier benefit based on duration of 
unemployment 
Laid-off workers satisfying 
conditions of employment 
duration and contributions 
(10.6; 14.2; 
21.3) 
Water subsidy Municipalities Discounts in municipal water bill 
according to socioeconomic 
classification 
Low-income private consumers 
of water 
2.8 
University credits MINEDUC Subsidized credits at below-market 
rates 
Low-income students enrolled 
in universities receiving State 
funds 
22.7 
Grants MINEDUC Scholarships of various amounts  Postgraduate students abroad, 
indigenous students, and sons 
of the missing and detainees 
(44.8; 71.2) 
Source: Author’s estimates from JUNAEB (1998), JUNJI (1998), INTEGRA (1998), MINEDUC 
(1996), MINSAL (1999), Superintendencia de la Seguridad Social (1996). JUNAEB, Council for 
scholarships and school food programs; JUNJI, Kindergarten National Council; INTEGRA, INTEGRA 
Foundation;  MINEDUC, Ministry of Education; MINSAL, Ministry of Health.  
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APPENDIX 3: PARTICIPATION AND WORKING HOUR ESTIMATES  
 
ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
 Female Male 
 Participation Working Hours (1) Participation Working Hours (1)
 Head Non-Head Head Non-head Head Non-head Head Non-head 
Individual characteristics:         
    Age **0.047 **0.022 -0.006 0.006 **-0.005 **0.002 -0.001 **-0.039 
    Age squared(2) **-0.001 **-0.0004     0.00001 **0.0004 
    Marriage dummy **-0.232 **-0.040 -0.049 0.002 **0.009 0.025 0.004 0.017 
Household characteristics:         
    Number of children, 0-11 **-0.101 **-0.051 -0.017 0.007 0.002 **0.028 0.004 -0.007 
    Number of children, 12-14 **-0.093 **-0.058 0.021 0.016 **0.010 **-0.074 0.0004 **0.031 
    Number of single women out of  
    the labor market **-0.512 **-0.123 **0.094 **0.046 *0.006 -0.008 0.007 **0.025 
    Number of elderly women **0.211 **0.066 -0.046 **-0.049 **-0.025 -0.030 -0.006 -0.008 
    Number of servants **0.294 **0253 -0.071 0.008 -0.005 **0.052 0.0001 0.006 
Individual labor income variables:         
    Estimated wage, log **0.219 **0.216 0.601 **0.589 **0.020 **0.525 **0.863 **1.027 
    Estimate wage squared, log(2)   -0.052 **-0.052   **-0.064 **-0.074 
   Estimated virtual income, log 0.153 -0.153 -0.331 0.472 **-0.115 **-3.499 -0.015 -0.477 
Individual non-labor incomes:          
    Primary **0.044 **0.034 0.003 0.002 **-0.003 **0.005 **0.003 **0.007 
    Cash transfers **-0.011 **0.035 *-0.010 **-0.007 -0.001 **-0.004 **-0.023 **0.005 
    In-kind education **-0.016 **-0.009 **-0.015 *-0.007 **-0.004 **-0.021 -0.001 0.004 
    In-kind health     **-0.059 **-0.036 **-0.066 **-0.061   **-0.017 ** -0.079 0.005 **-0.046 
Non-labor incomes from other 
members:         
    Primary -0.005 **0.038 -0.010 **0.043 **0.001 **0.037 0.0004 **0.047 
    Cash transfers **-0.011 -0.001 -0.008 *-0.004 **-0.003 **-0.005 **-0.002 0.001 
    In-kind education **0.021 -0.007 0.003 *-0.004 0.0002 **0.006 -0.0002 -0.002 
    In-kind health **0.023 **0.005 0.002 **-0.006 0.001 *0.002 *0.001 -0.0004 
Household head characteristics:         
    Kinship  0.001  **-0.012  **-0.023  **-0.008 
    Male dummy  **-0.151  0.001  **-0.078  **0.033 
    Estimated wage, log  **0.016  **0.046  **0.111  **0.100 
    Estimated wage squared, log(2)  **-0.004  **-0.009  **-0.018  **-0.016 
Labor status:         
    Unemployed  **0.147  -0.124  0.062  0.010 
    Informal  **-0.176  0.099  -0.057  0.032 
    Formal  **-0.183  *0.111  -0.106  0.061 
Occupation:         
    Employer  **0.322  0.045  **0.159  **0.156 
    Self-employed  **0.282  0.008  **0.128  0.062 
    Worker  **0.238  -0.041  0.056  -0.005 
Sector:         
    Agriculture  **-0.031  -0.004  **0.182  -0.014 
    Manufacture  **-0.040  0.002  0.032  -0.021 
    Services  0.005  -0.031  **-0.081  0.015 
Mills Ratio   -0.081 **-0.008   -0.112 **-0.477 
Constant -3.516 0.001 6.464 -4.541 **1.698 **41.020 1.188 6.675 
         
No. Observations 6,370 39,919 2,573 10,884 23,461     20,797 19,546 9,485 
Log Likelihood -2,129 -10,512   -4,678 -7,828   
Observed participation 0.465 0.335   0.891 0.501   
Predicted participation 0.401 0.247   0.960 0.431   
F(n,d)   **3.0 ** 5.5   **7.7 **6.1 
R2   0.0457 0.0480   0.0126 0.0939 
 
Source: Author’s estimates from 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996).  
Note: (1) Working hour models for the extreme and moderate poor are jointly estimated, as the 
separated sample for extreme poor was not sufficiently large for consistent estimation.  
(2) Only the preferred version between the linear and non-linear specification form is reported.  
Non-labor primary incomes refer to pensions, rents and financial incomes. All elasticities estimated at 
the mean of all variables in the model. (*) indicates statistical significance at 10% level; (**) statistical 
significance at 5% level.  
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EXTREMELY POOR 
 Female Male 
 Participation Working Hours (1) Participation Working Hours (1)
 Head Non-Head Head Non-head Head Non-head Head Non-head 
Individual characteristics:         
    Age 0.008 **0.022 **0.024 0.003 **0.028 **0.056 **-0.006 -0.009 
    Age squared (2)  -0.0001  0.0001 **-0.0003 **-0.001   
    Marriage dummy -0.255 -0.057 0.087 -0.142 0.114 -0.036 **0.132 -0.007 
Household characteristics:         
    Number of children, 0-11 -0.091 -0.023 -0.028 0.017 -0.003 -0.070 0.021 -0.012 
    Number of children, 12-14 0.182 -0.017 -0.038 0.002 0.139 0.075 0.014 -0.090 
    Number of single women out of 
the labor market ** -0.352 -0.026 **0.193 0.078 *-0.070 0.004 **0.056 -0.006 
    Number of elderly women 0.071 **0.143 -0.027 -0.101 *0.348 0.004 0.135 0.023 
    Number of servants **0.524 **0.324 -0.032 0.077 *0.131 0.124 -0.008 0.037 
Individual labor income variables:         
    Estimated wage, log 0.003 **1.241 0.026 0.233 -0.032 **3.546 1.085 0.096 
    Estimate wage squared, log (2)  **-0.101  -0.021  **-0.277 -0.083  
   Estimated virtual income, log 1.179 **1.599 *2.140 0.696 -1.308 -1.282 0.721 -0.067 
Individual non-labor incomes:          
    Primary **-0.049 *-0.010 -0.002 ** -0.134 ** -0.031 ** -0.166 **0.058 -0.008 
    Cash transfers 0.013 **-0.014 **-0.536 **0.012 -0.005 * -0.019 0.003 -0.002 
    In-kind education -0.011 **0.146 *-0.023 ** -0.053 ** -0.036 **0.427 0.004 -0.008 
    In-kind health M.C. **-0.042 M.C. * -0.058 M.C. **-0.062 **0.049 -0.011 
Non-labor incomes from other 
members:         
    Primary -0.009 0.003 **-0.039 -0.021 0.009 * -0.015 0.018 -0.004 
    Cash transfers 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 *-0.015 -0.006 0.000 
    In-kind education 0.020 **0.011 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 0.014 -0.003 0.004 
    In-kind health 0.015 -0.002 0.014 -0.008 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.013 
Household head characteristics:         
    Kinship  0.004  0.005  -0.018  -0.020 
    Male dummy  **-0.145  0.099  **-0.318  0.084 
    Estimated wage, log  0.031  *-0.198  -0.041  0.110 
    Estimated wage squared, log(2)  -0.010  0.016  0.006  **-0.029 
Labor status:         
    Unemployed  0.019  -0.235  -0.005  0.093 
    Informal  -0.216  **0.599  -0.152  **0.638 
    Formal  *-0.219  **0.707  -0.260  *0.521 
Occupation:         
    Employer  M.C.  -0.157  M.C.  -0.170 
    Self-employed  **0.274  -0.034  0.334  -0.248 
    Worker  **0.235  -0.049  0.399  -0.217 
Sector:         
    Agriculture  0.021  -0.175  0.033  -0.137 
    Manufacture  -0.204  -0.015  0.003  0.023 
    Services  -0.091  0.002  -0.129  -0.194 
Mills Ratio   *-0.286 -0.041   *-0.201 **-0.365 
Constant ** -14.951 **-24.150 *-24.185 -5.829 **16.475 4.637 -8.918 4.355 
         
No. Observations 254 596 377 622 339 321 1,462 576 
Log Likelihood -50 -175   -135 -118   
Observed participation 0.609 0.238   0.759 0.367   
Predicted participation 0.817 0.123   0.822 0.226   
F(n,d)   **3.6 ** 3.2   **24.6 **2.8 
R2   0.0859 0.1167   0.0531 0.0690 
Source: Author’s estimates from 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996).  
Note: (1) Working hour models for the extreme and moderate poor are jointly estimated, as the 
separated sample for extreme poor was not sufficiently large for consistent estimation.  
(2) Only the preferred version between the linear and non-linear specification form is reported.  
Non-labor primary incomes refer to pensions, rents and financial incomes. All elasticities estimated at 
the mean of all variables in the model. (*) indicates statistical significance at 10% level; (**) statistical 
significance at 5% level. (M.C.) indicates that the variable is dropped due to multiple collinearity.  
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MODERATELY POOR 
 Female Male 
 Participation Working Hours (1) Participation Working Hours (1)
 Head Non-Head Head Non-head Head Non-head Head Non-head 
Individual characteristics:         
    Age **0.058 **0.014 **0.024 0.003 *0.007 **0.066 **-0.006 -0.009 
    Age squared(2) **-0.001 **-0.0001  0.0001 **-0.0001 **-0.001   
    Marriage dummy **-0.450 -0.029 0.087 -0.142 0.008 0.055 **0.132 -0.007 
Household characteristics:         
    Number of children, 0-11 **-0.111 **-0.022 -0.028 0.017 -0.001 **0.050 0.021 -0.012 
    Number of children, 12-14 -0.070 -0.013 -0.038 0.002 0.011 *0.072 0.014 -0.090 
    Number of single women out of 
the labor market **-0.327 *-0.019 **0.193 0.078 0.007 0.008 **0.056 -0.006 
    Number of elderly women -0.071 -0.017 -0.027 -0.101 0.008 **-0.181 0.135 0.023 
    Number of servants **0.335 **0.172 -0.032 0.077 -0.013 0.037 -0.008 0.037 
Individual labor income variables:         
    Estimated wage, log **0.199 **-0.832 0.026 0.233 -0.018 *1.604 1.085 0.096 
    Estimate wage squared, log(2)  **0.079  -0.021  *-0.133 -0.083  
   Estimated virtual income, log 0.676 **0.596 *2.140 0.696 0.278 0.006 0.721 -0.067 
Individual non-labor incomes:          
    Primary 0.011 **0.007 -0.002 ** -0.134 ** -0.009 0.008 **0.058 -0.008 
    Cash transfers -0.009 -0.003 **-0.536 **0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
    In-kind education *-0.014 -0.009 *-0.023 ** -0.053 ** -0.009 **-0.013 0.004 -0.008 
    In-kind health M.C. **-0.035 M.C. * -0.058 *-0.019 ** -0.071 **0.049 -0.011 
Non-labor incomes from other 
members:         
    Primary -0.018 0.012 **-0.039 -0.021 0.002 **0.013 0.018 -0.004 
    Cash transfers **-0.023 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.0001 0.004 -0.006 0.000 
    In-kind education **0.038 0.0001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.0003 0.001 -0.003 0.004 
    In-kind health **0.029 0.001 0.014 -0.008 0.003 **-0.011 -0.005 0.013 
Household head characteristics:         
    Kinship  -0.002  0.005  **-0.017  -0.020 
    Male dummy  *-0.060  0.099  -0.038  0.084 
    Estimated wage, log  **0.052  *-0.198  0.063  0.110 
    Estimated wage squared, log(2)  **-0.008  0.016  -0.010  **-0.029 
Labor status:         
    Unemployed  *0.067  -0.235  0.057  0.093 
    Informal  **-0.258  **0.599  -0.116  **0.638 
    Formal  **-0.257  **0.707  -0.094  *0.521 
Occupation:         
    Employer  **0.320  -0.157  M.C.  -0.170 
    Self-employed  **0.261  -0.034  0.135  -0.248 
    Worker  **0.179  -0.049  -0.064  -0.217 
Sector:         
    Agriculture  -0.012  -0.175  *0.120  -0.137 
    Manufacture  **-0.080  -0.015  0.121  0.023 
    Services  -0.002  0.002  0.095  -0.194 
Mills Ratio   *-0.286 -0.041   *-0.201 **-0.365 
Constant -10.459 -5.942 *-24.185 -5.829 -3.296 -5.857 -8.918 4.355 
         
No. Observations 645 3,476 377 622 1,762 1,719 1,462 576 
Log Likelihood -215 -1,325   -383 -118   
Observed participation 0.481 0.218   0.901 0.367   
Predicted participation 0.432 0.141   0.948 0.226   
F(n,d)   **3.6 ** 3.2   **24.6 **2.8 
R2   0.0859 0.1167   0.0531 0.0690 
Source: Author’s estimates from 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996).  
Note: (1) Working hour models for the extreme and moderate poor are jointly estimated, as the 
separated sample for extreme poor was not sufficiently large for consistent estimation.  
(2) Only the preferred version between the linear and non-linear specification form is reported.  
Non-labor primary incomes refer to pensions, rents and financial incomes. All elasticities estimated at 
the mean of all variables in the model. (*) indicates statistical significance at 10% level; (**) statistical 
significance at 5% level. (M.C.) indicates that the variable is dropped due to multiple collinearity.  
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NON-POOR 
 Female Male 
 Participation Working Hours (1) Participation Working Hours (1)
 Head Non-Head Head Non-head Head Non-head Head Non-head 
Individual characteristics:         
    Age **0.047 **0.023 -0.009 0.006 **-0.004 **0.003 0.011 **-0.040 
    Age squared(2) **-0.001 **-0.0004  -0.0002   -0.0001 **0.0005 
    Marriage dummy **-0.215 **-0.038 -0.038 0.007 *0.007 0.017 0.011 0.017 
Household characteristics:         
    Number of children, 0-11 **-0.105 **-0.057 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 **0.023 0.009 -0.005 
    Number of children, 12-14 **-0.111 **-0.065 0.014 0.018 0.005 **-0.088 0.008 **0.045 
    Number of single women out of 
the labor market **-0.535 **-0.139 **0.084 0.031 0.004 -0.013 *0.015 **0.032 
    Number of elderly women **0.227 **0.070 -0.076 **-0.047 **-0.019 -0.036 -0.027 -0.019 
    Number of servants **0.199 **0.271 -0.081 0.009 0.002 *-0.058 -0.001 0.007 
Individual labor income variables:         
    Estimated wage, log **0.212 **0.221 0.352 **0.548 *0.011 **0.502 **0.466 **0.998 
    Estimate wage squared, log(2)   -0.029 **-0.050   **-0.037 **-0.070 
   Estimated virtual income, log 0.137 **-0.345 0.559 0.361 -0.035 **-3.647 0.044 *-0.604 
Individual non-labor incomes:          
    Primary **-0.008 **0.012 -0.004 ** 0.021 ** -0.002 ** 0.509 0.00004 **0.006 
    Cash transfers **-0.010 **-0.004 -0.010 **0.094 **-0.001 * -0.005 -0.003 **0.005 
    In-kind education **-0.016 **0-0.010 **-0.014 -0.005 ** -0.003 **-0.019 -0.003 0.004 
    In-kind health **-0.062 **-0.034 **-0.065 **-0.063 **-0.013 ** -0.079 **0.531 **-0.048 
Non-labor incomes from other 
members:         
    Primary -0.006 **0.043 -0.003 **0.054 0.0004 **0.032 0.003 **0.045 
    Cash transfers **-0.010 -0.002 -0.008 -0.003 **-0.002 **-0.005 -0.002 0.002 
    In-kind education **0.019 **0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.0002 **0.008 -0.002 -0.003 
    In-kind health **0.024 **-0.005 -0.001 **-0.005 0.0002 **0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
Household head characteristics:         
    Kinship  0.001  **-0.011  **-0.021  **-0.006 
    Male dummy  **-0.167  -0.014  **-0.084  **0.034 
    Estimated wage, log  **0.028  **0.061  **0.131  **0.106 
    Estimated wage squared, log(2)  **-0.006  **-0.011  **-0.021  **-0.017 
Labor status:         
    Unemployed  **0.182  -0.042  **0.137  -0.005 
    Informal  *-0.083  0.058  0.085  0.041 
    Formal  *-0.006  0.069  0.206  0.074 
Occupation:         
    Employer  **0.251  0.063  -0.006  **0.121 
    Self-employed  **0.212  0.041  -0.011  0.031 
    Worker  **0.169  -0.131  -0.089  -0.041 
Sector:         
    Agriculture  **-0.034  0.001  **0.205  -0.004 
    Manufacture  **-0.038  -0.002  0.031  -0.024 
    Services  0.005  -0.027  **-0.085  0.022 
Mills Ratio   -0.067 -0.062   0.017 **-0.471 
Constant -3.234 2.394 10.057 -3.144 0.699 **43.117 1.526 *8.351 
         
No. Observations 5,410 34,965 2,178 10,062 20,932 18,169 17,860 8,571 
Log Likelihood -1,792 -16,081   -3,795 -6,732   
Observed participation 0.461 0.348   0.897 0.504   
Predicted participation 0.389 0.261   0.970 0.440   
F(n,d)   **2.5 ** 5.3   **4.0 **5.6 
R2   0.0407 0.0573   0.0531 0.1017 
Source: Author’s estimates from 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996).  
Note: (1) Working hour models for the extreme and moderate poor are jointly estimated, as the 
separated sample for extreme poor was not sufficiently large for consistent estimation.  
(2) Only the preferred version between the linear and non-linear specification form is reported.  
Non-labor primary incomes refer to pensions, rents and financial incomes. All elasticities estimated at 
the mean of all variables in the model. (*) indicates statistical significance at 10% level; (**) statistical 
significance at 5% level.   
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Table 1. Predicted Effects of Social Transfers in the Intrahousehold Decision to 
Work  
 
 Direct Indirect Bargaining Total 
Type of Effect: 
Effects of 
controlled 
incomes on 
work effort 
Effects of 
other 
household 
members’ 
controlled 
incomes on 
work effort 
Effects on the controlled incomes All effects combined 
Household member: Individual 
Other 
household 
members 
Individual 
Other 
household 
members 
Individual 
Other 
household 
members 
Type of social transfer: Cash In-kind Cash 
In-
kind Cash 
In-
kind Cash 
In-
kind Cash 
In-
kind Cash 
In-
kind 
PARTICIPATION             
Unitary  <0 <0 <0 <0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. <0 <0 <0 <0 
Exogenous Bargaining <0 <0 <0 0 0 0 0 0 <0 <0 <0 <0 
Endogenous Bargaining <0 <0 <0 0 <0 <0 either >0 <0 <0 either >0 
WORKING HOURS             
Unitary  <0 <0 <0 <0 >0 >0 >0 >0 either either either either 
Exogenous Bargaining <0 <0 <0 0 >0 0 >0 >0 either <0 either >0 
Endogenous Bargaining <0 <0 <0 <0 >0 >0 either either either either either either 
Source: Author 
Note: unitary models predicted effects are calculated assuming that equal bargaining power among 
household members, that is, θi = 1/n, where n is the number of members in a household. ‘n.a.’, not 
applicable. 
 
 
Table 2. Tests on Intrahousehold Behavior 
 Unitary Household 
Model 
Exogenous 
Bargaining Model 
Endogenous 
Bargaining Model 
with social transfers 
as determinants 
Ho : 
0
0
0
0
0
0
11
10
9
7
6
5
<
<
<
<
<
<
i
i
i
i
i
i
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
 
0
0
0
0
0
0
11
10
9
7
6
5
=
=
<
<
<
<
i
i
i
i
i
i
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
 
0
0
0
0
0
11
10
7
6
5
>
>
<
<
<
i
i
i
i
i
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
 
HA: otherwise otherwise otherwise 
Source: Author 
Note: tests defined over participation elasticities in specification (1) 
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Table 3. Participation and Working Hour Elasticities of Non-labor Incomes 
  Female Male 
  Participation Working Hours Participation Working Hours 
  Head Non-Head Head 
Non-
head Head 
Non-
head Head 
Non-
head 
All non-labor incomes      ** -3.60 *0.58 -0.37 0.08 **-0.30 **-4.96 0.02 **-0.62 
All individual non-labor 
incomes  
 **-4.31 0.02 -0.33 -0.03 **-0.38 **-5.32 **-0.16 **0.63 
All non-labor from other 
household members 
 -0.99 **19.02 -0.63 **5.23 **0.18 **6.51 0.18 **4.16 
Individual non-labor 
incomes:  
         
    Primary γ4 **1.34 **8.98 0.32 0.23 **-0.31 **1.25 **0.26 **0.67 
    Cash transfers γ5 **-2.06 **9.87 *-1.09 **-0.67 -0.09 **-1.07 **-1.67 **0.47 
    In-kind education γ6 **-4.09 **-3.97 **-1.49 *-0.74 **-0.45 **-4.85 -0.14 0.35 
    In-kind health γ7 **-1.37 **-14.37 **-6.62 **-6.19 **-1.79 **-18.36 0.49 **-4.58 
Non-labor incomes from 
other household  
members: 
 
        
    Primary γ8 -1.37 **15.71 -1.05 **4.29 **0.13 **8.57 0.04 **4.75 
    Cash transfers γ9 **-0.28 -0.59 -0.81 *-0.42 **-0.26 **-1.14 **-0.20 0.14 
    In-kind education γ10 **5.28 -1.02 0.31 *-0.37 0.02 **1.51 -0.02 -0.23 
    In-kind health γ11 **5.77 **1.89 0.18 **-0.61 0.07 *0.39 *0.14 -0.04 
          
No. Observations  6,370 39,919 2,573 10,884 23,461 20,797 19,546 9,485 
Log Likelihood  -2,129 -10,512   -4,678 -7,828   
Observed participation  0.465 0.335   0.891 0.501   
Predicted participation  0.401 0.247   0.96 0.431   
F(n,d)    **3.0 **5.5   **7.7 **6.1 
R2    0.0457 0.0480   0.0126 0.0939 
Source: Author’s estimates from 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996).  
Note: Non-labor primary incomes refer to pensions, rents, financial incomes and self-consumption. All 
elasticities estimated at the mean of all variables in the model. (*) indicates statistical significance at 
10% level; (**) statistical significance at 5% level.  
 
 
Table 4.  Tests on the Specification of Intrahousehold Allocation Models 
 Female Male 
 Head Non-head Head Non-head 
Unitary household model Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected 
Exogenous Bargaining Model Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected 
Endogenous Bargaining Model with 
Social Transfers as determinants Ho Accepted Ho Accepted Ho  Rejected Ho Accepted 
Source: Author 
Note: tests from estimated elasticities of participation in specification [1]. 
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Table 5. Tests on the Specification of Intrahousehold Allocation Models By 
Socio-economic Group 
 Exogenous Bargaining Model Endogenous Bargaining Model with Social Transfers as Determinants 
 Extreme Poor 
Moderate  
Poor Non-Poor 
Extreme 
Poor 
Moderate 
Poor Non-Poor 
Female Head Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Accepted 
Female Non-head Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Accepted 
Male Head Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Accepted Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected 
Male Non-head Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Rejected Ho Accepted 
Source: Author 
Note: tests from estimated elasticities of participation in specification [1]. 
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